

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, Canada joined consensus on resolution 72/24, in which the Assembly called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Canada abstained on resolution 72/39, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", in which the Assembly, inter alia, called upon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In keeping with its long-standing position on this issue, Canada also voted against resolution 72/67, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".
2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including a conference on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Canada continues to support broad consultations by the three convenors with all relevant stakeholders to arrive at modalities for a successful conference to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Any weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested.
3. Canada also continues to call for the universal and full adherence to and compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conferences in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2017, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensus approach and because the resolution during that time period did not address serious breaches in compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards requirements by some other States in the region, as determined by IAEA and reported by the Agency to the Security Council. Canada has also worked



with other States in the context of successive IAEA General Conferences to prevent unhelpful and politically-motivated resolutions from having a negative impact on efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

4. Canada appeals to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We urge those States in the region that have signed an additional protocol to ratify it without further delay.

5. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored resolution 72/70 at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, as well as Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), adopted in September 2016, and continues to encourage all States in the region, particularly those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence- and security-building measure. Canada is also providing funding and technical support to construct, test and certify a radionuclide monitoring station in Kazakhstan as a cooperating national facility to strengthen the capacity of the Treaty's International Monitoring System to verify compliance with the Treaty.

6. Canada continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed between the five plus one group (P5+1) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. While Canada remains seriously concerned about the long-term nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, given its history of nuclear proliferation and its ongoing ballistic missile programme, we believe the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action can effectively constrain the country's nuclear programme, so long as the Plan of Action is fully and verifiably implemented. Since 2014, Canada has contributed \$12 million to support IAEA verification of the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We believe it is in the interest of the international community for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to be maintained in order to prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. The Islamic Republic of Iran must continue to fully implement all of the commitments it agreed to under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in order to build the international community's confidence that the country's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful in nature. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action subjects the Islamic Republic of Iran to an extensive international verification regime that provides the international community with a high degree of insight into the country's nuclear programme. Canada welcomes the provisional application by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the Additional Protocol to its Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, but urges the Islamic Republic of Iran to expeditiously ratify the Additional Protocol as an additional confidence-building measure.

7. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic that suggest nuclear cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada fully supported the IAEA Board of Governors resolution (GOV/2011/41), in which the Board requested the IAEA Director General to report to the Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dayr al-Zawr, in breach of the safeguards obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic. While recognizing the challenges posed by the current security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the cooperation, information and access necessary to address the country's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues". We also continue to urge the Syrian Arab

Republic to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. Only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA can the Syrian Arab Republic restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme. We note with regret that the Syrian Arab Republic will assume the next presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, given its record of chemical weapons attacks in disregard of international norms and law.

8. Canada continues to call on all remaining States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, which are referenced in paragraph 1 of the present report.

9. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.

10. Canada has followed up on its Nuclear Security Summit pledges by promoting nuclear security around the world, including in the Middle East region. To date, Canada has provided over \$16 million in funding to Jordan to strengthen its nuclear detection capabilities to combat nuclear trafficking and smuggling, including through the installation of radiation monitoring equipment at key border points and by establishing a training centre to counter nuclear smuggling. As a part of more than \$40 million provided to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, Canadian funds have been used to safely and securely remove disused sealed radioactive sources from Lebanon and strengthen the physical protection and cybersecurity of nuclear facilities in Egypt.